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I. INTRODUCTION
“When my wife and I met in college, the attraction was immediate, and we
quickly became inseparable. . . . We married soon after graduation . . . and
had three children by the time we were 30. We were both born to lesbians,
she . . . had sought out her biological father as soon as she turned 18, as the
sperm bank her parents used allowed contact once the children were 18 if both
parties consented. I decided to . . . see if my biological father was interested in
contact as well. He was, and even though our parents had used different sperm
banks, it appears so did our father, as he is the same person. . . . I can’t help
but think “This is my sister” every time I look at her now. . . . Please help me
figure out where to go from here.”1
The scenario described in the advice column above, which Professor Naomi Cahn
refers to as “accidental incest,”2 is one of the three main justifications for establishing a
nationwide registry to systematically track sperm, egg, and embryo (hereinafter referred
to as “gamete”) donors and the results of those donations.
Advocates argue that a donor gamete registry, in addition to preventing accidental
incest, would facilitate increased access to donors’ medical history and outcomes of
their previous donations. This information would benefit intended parents and their
resulting offspring by informing their reproductive and medical decisions.3 Consider
the case of Anne Morriss and Frances Frei. Their son, who was conceived with donor
sperm purchased from a well-known sperm bank, has medium-chain acyl-CoA
dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD), a rare genetic disease that prevents the body
from converting fats into sugar.4 MCADD is a recessive trait, meaning that it develops
if “a child inherits two flawed copies of a gene, one from each parent,” which has a
25% chance of occurring if both parents are carriers.5 Morriss was unaware that she
was an MCADD carrier until her son was born, and the sperm donor is probably still
unaware that he is an MCADD carrier.6
1

Emily Yoffe, Dear Prudence: My Wife Is My Sister, Slate, Feb. 19, 2013, 6:15AM, http://www.
slate.com/articles/life/dear_prudence/2013/02/dear_prudence_my_wife_and_i_came_from_the_
same_sperm_donor.html.
2

See generally Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—Or the Curtain?—For
Reproductive Technology, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 59, 59–60 (2009) (quoting Libby Purves, Whose
Body is it Anyway?, The Times, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/
columnists/libbypurves/article2043028.ece) [hereinafter Cahn, Accidental Incest].
3

Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21
J.L. & Health 1, 14–15 (2007).
4

Carolyn Y. Johnson, Company Seeks to Make Sperm Banks Safer, Bos. Globe, Oct. 14, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/10/13/company-seeks-make-spermbanks-safer-but-raises-questions-about-preconception-dna-testing/rIV2rypd3NnRRYQdeszR1M/
story.html; Paul Rincon, Genepeeks Firm to Offer “Digital Baby” Screen for Sperm Donors,
BBC News: Science & Environment, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/scienceenvironment-24398312.
5

Johnson, supra note 4.

6

See, e.g., Jennifer Bleyer, A Conception Conundrum, Psychol. Today, Nov. 5, 2013, at 78, 85,
available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201310/conception-conundrum )(noting
“dozens of documented cases” where donated sperm is still on the market even though children
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While sperm banks screen donors for the most common genetic diseases, they do not
currently screen donors to see if they are recessive carriers for rare genetic conditions.
Morriss has now cofounded GenePeeks, a company that simulates the reproductive
process to determine the hypothetical offspring’s risk for single-gene recessive
conditions. This information will inform intended parents’ choice of donor by signaling
out donors whose genetic material, when combined with the donor’s sperm or egg, could
result in illness. A gamete donor registry would allow parents to view this information
prior to purchasing donor gametes, and allow the donor and any resulting children to
share relevant medical history or genetic information with each other and with any other
donor offspring.
Finally, children born from gamete donations are increasingly borrowing from the
adoption rights movement7 in claiming a psychological benefit from knowing (perhaps
even a right to know) their genetic origins, including the identifying information of
their gamete donors,8 and to establish relationships with their genetic half-siblings.
Consider Generation Cryo, a new reality show on MTV that “follows Breeanna,
daughter of a lesbian couple who was conceived through sperm donation—‘Grandma
signed for the sperm,’ her parents tell her—on a search to connect with her genetic half
siblings and, ultimately, her sperm donor.”9 Family law is not necessarily equipped
to handle these demands.10 The legal limitations of guaranteeing a “right to know”
one’s genetic origins do not diminish the psychological importance of genetic ties for
identity formation.11 A gamete donor registry would facilitate these connections for
those who want to make them.

conceived with that sperm suffer from genetic conditions); Nathalia Holt, Weaving together the
DNA of parenthood, SciLogs, Oct. 31 2012, available at http://www.scilogs.com/backstory/weavingtogether-the-dna-of-parenthood/ (discussing how a parent may unknowingly carry a recessive trait
such as MCADD).
7

Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete Databank,
12 DePaul J. Health Care L. 203, 213–214 (2009) [hereinafter Cahn, Necessary Subjects].
8

Dennison, supra note 3, at 16–19.

9

Jon Caramanica, Half Siblings Linked by a Mystery Father: MTV’s “Generation Cryo” Links
Families, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/arts/television/mtvsgeneration-cyro-links-families.html?_r=0.
10

For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently dismissed a petition
asserting a right to sibling visitation with the petitioner’s half-sibling who was conceived with the
same anonymously-donated sperm because the state’s custody and visitation statute only confers
parents, not siblings, with visitation rights. Bobbie Jo R. v. Traci W., No. 11-1753, 2013 WL
2462173 at *2 (W. Va. June 7, 2013)(unpublished opinion)(dismissing a petition asserting a right to
sibling visitation with the petitioner’s half-sibling who was conceived with the same anonymouslydonated sperm because the state’s custody and visitation statute only confers parents, not siblings,
with visitation rights).
11

Jean Benward et al., Maximizing Autonomy and the Changing View of Donor Conception: The
Creation of a National Donor Registry, 12 DePaul J. Health Care L. 225, 232–34 (2009). But see
H.M.W. Bos & N.K. Gartrell, Adolescents of the U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study:
The Impact of Having a Known or an Unknown Donor on the Stability of Psychological Adjustment,
26 Hum. Reprod. 630, 636 (2011) (“Our findings indicate that donor type has no bearing on the
development of the psychological well-being of the offspring of lesbian mothers over a 7-year
period from childhood through adolescence.”).
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In the last few years, dozens of academics, practitioners, and students have written
law review articles debating the merits and pitfalls of anonymous gamete donation.
Those in favor of non-anonymous gamete donation often advocate two concomitant
policy proposals: the creation of a national gamete donor registry,12 and a requirement
that all gamete donations be “open”—that the resulting children have access to their
donors’ information at the age of majority.13 Those against mandatory open gamete
donation argue that this policy would compromise the fundamental privacy rights of
both the intended parents and the donors.14 As scholars debate the merits of mandatory
open gamete donation, the assisted reproductive technology (ART) industry is trending
toward non-anonymous gamete donation. More clinics are providing an open donation
option,15 donor-conceived children and their parents are creating or joining private online
donor registries to find their genetic relatives.16 Donor-conceived children are using the
Internet to track down their donors, regardless of whether the clinic guaranteed donor
anonymity.17 Despite the real consumer demand for more information about gamete
donors, the current ad-hoc response to this demand is inadequate because participation
in existing registries is voluntary and the donor medical history that clinics and banks
require is not systematically tracked across different clinics or after donation occurs.18
Given these shortcomings, the United States needs a national donor gamete registry
to standardize information across states and industry, provide equal access to donor
information, and facilitate connections with genetic relatives while respecting the
privacy rights of donors and parents. This paper proposes a national donor gamete
12

Cahn, Necessary Subjects, supra note 7, at 223.

13

Id. But see Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca Ireland, Anonymously Provided Sperm and the
Constitution, 23 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1 (2012) (arguing that while a donor registry is good policy,
offspring do not have a right to know a donor’s identity).
14

Nicole J. Messing, Note, Protecting a Man’s Right to Choose: Why Mandatory Identity Release
for Sperm Donors Is a Bad Idea, 16 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 429 (2012) (arguing against
mandatory identity release legislation because it would violate individuals’ constitutionally protected
right to privacy with regard to reproduction); Julie L. Sauer, Comment, Competing Interests and
Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 919 (2009) (arguing that states
should balance the privacy interests of parents, children, and donors by permitting, but not requiring,
open donation).
15

Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet Is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction: From
Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 477,
485 (2010).
16

Donor Sibling Registry, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).

17

Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product
Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 857, 857–58 (2007) (“Recently a fifteen-year-old boy decided
to track down his genetic father. He sent a swab of his own saliva to an online DNA lab. He waited
nine months for initial results to return. He then gathered additional information from his mother
about his sperm donor father (year of birth, hometown, and surname) and commissioned an online
investigation service to determine the true match. Within ten days, the boy met his biological father.
Is this an isolated case? No.”).
18

See Rene Almeling, The Unregulated Sperm Industry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/opinion/sunday/the-unregulated-sperm-industry.html [hereinafter
Almeling, The Unregulated Sperm Industry] (“In the United States, we do not track how
many sperm donors there are, how often they donate, or how many children are born from the
donations.”).
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registry that mandates a basic level of donor participation, but does not require donors
to disclose any identifying information or impose a post-donation obligation to update
their medical histories unless they agree to do so. This approach, while modest, would
be a huge step forward from the current laissez-faire state of gamete donation. It would
respond to the three main consequences of donor anonymity—accidental incest, limited
access to medical history, and the psychological desire to know one’s genetic origins—
without establishing undue state intrusion into the protected rights associated with
individual health information and family privacy.
This paper will fill a gap in the literature by delving into the concrete details of what
a national donor gamete registry would actually look like, the legal authority for
establishing it, and how it would be implemented. A national gamete donor registry
raises several legal and policy questions. Should all clinics and donors be required, or
merely encouraged, to participate in the registry? What are the HIPAA implications of
creating such a registry? Would only donors and offspring have access to the registry, or
would it also be open to clinics, researchers, or commercial entities, or even the public
at large? Does the federal government already have the authority to establish a registry
pursuant to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) authority
under the Fertility Clinic Success Rate & Certification Act (FCSRCA), or the Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular
and Tissue-Based Products (HCT/Ps), or would Congress have to pass a statute? This
paper will analyze these questions by considering the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services’ (HHS’s) increased authority over and involvement with post-market
patient and product registries and other electronically stored health information, as well
as FDA’s assertion of authority over novel ART procedures, to contextualize a national
donor gamete registry within the current regulatory atmosphere.
With these legal and policy considerations in mind, this paper proposes that the FDA
and the CDC, in collaboration with the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), establish a national donor gamete registry that employs a tiered approach to
the disclosure of donor information. Tier I would require all fertility clinics and donor
gamete banks to disclose donors’ health and screening information (that they already
collect pursuant to FDA regulations) at the time of donation. In addition, Tier I would
mandate that clinics and banks input how many times a donor’s gametes had been used
for conception, and whether that process had resulted in a successful pregnancy and
birth. Finally, Tier I would set a national limit on the number of offspring born from any
one donor’s contributions.
At the time of donation, the donor would be able to select whether his or her data could
be used for research purposes, and would have the option of “upgrading” to a higher tier
by agreeing to disclose more information. Tier II would consist of further disclosure of
non-medical personal history and physical characteristics, which many donors already
disclose to sperm banks (e.g., race, height, weight, education, profession, baby picture,
clinic’s impressions of donor, etc.). Tier III would require a more complete medical
history beyond what the FDA currently requires and would allow the donor to continually
upgrade his or her health information and medical history after donation. Finally, Tier
IV would retain the donor’s identifying information and make that information available
to any resulting children at the age of eighteen (if so requested). Regardless of tier, all
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children born from donor gametes would be able to view their donor’s profile, “link” to
that profile to identify oneself as the progeny of that donor to connect to other children
born from the same donor (and thus prevent accidental incest), and disclose any relevant
genetic condition or medical history that they wish to share.
Part II of this paper summarizes the FDA’s and the CDC’s current authority over ART,
provides background on the donor gamete industry, and introduces the privately-run
Donor Sibling Registry. Part III discusses in further detail the policy justifications for a
gamete donor registry. Part IV provides an overview of HHS’s increasing involvement
with post-market product and patient registries, as well as the health privacy concerns
involved in this increased surveillance. Part V proposes a national gamete donor
registry—a public-private partnership between the CDC, the FDA, and the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART). Part VI explains the legal authority for
creating such a registry, as well as its health privacy implications. Ultimately, this paper
contends that a national donor gamete registry would represent an incremental change
to existing ART regulation that would complement HHS’s existing reliance on postmarket surveillance.

II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT & INDUSTRY PRACTICE
A. Fertility Clinic Success Rate & Certification Act
Approximately 61,610 infants, or 1.56% of the total infants born in the United States in
2011,19 were born as a result of assisted reproductive technology (ART).20 Despite the
exponential growth of ART, a $3 billion dollar industry in the United States,21 Congress
has passed only a single law governing the industry: the Fertility Clinic Success Rate
Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA).22 The Act’s objective is to prevent fertility clinics
from inflating their success rates to attract consumers.23 FCSRCA serves two main
purposes: (1) it instructs the CDC to develop a model embryo laboratory certification
program for states to adopt on a voluntary basis,24 and (2) it requires that all ART

19

Brady E. Hamilton et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Births: Preliminary Data for 2011 (National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 61, No. 5,
Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_05.pdf.
20

Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
21

Issues: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Pro-Choice Alliance for Responsible Research,
http://prochoicealliance.org.s66061.gridserver.com/Assisted-Reproductive-Technologies (last visited
Nov. 5, 2013).
22

Fertility Clinic Success Rate Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA), Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106
Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 263a(1-7) (2012)).
23

See Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Market for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability:
Why Can We Sell Our Eggs But Not Our Livers?, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 643, 659 (2008).
24

FCSRCA § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2. No state has adopted the certification program. Yaniv
Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue: The Need for Federal
Regulation, 11 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 243, 251 n.38 (2010).
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programs annually report their pregnancy success rates25 to the CDC, which must publish
this information in a publicly-available annual report.26 The Act delegates authority
to the CDC to establish procedures to approve outside accreditation organizations to
inspect and certify embryo laboratories on its behalf.27 FCSRCA explicitly prohibits the
CDC from regulating the practice of ART medicine in developing its embryo laboratory
certification program.28 Although Congress defined ART for purposes of the statute,29
it unequivocally delegated authority to HHS to amend the definition through noticeand-comment procedures.30 In its final notice concerning pregnancy success reporting
requirements, the CDC clarified that ART does not include artificial insemination;31
therefore, ART clinics do not have to report pregnancy success rates for patients who
only receive donor sperm (e.g., use their own eggs and do not undergo IVF).
To collect ART clinic data on pregnancy success rates, CDC chose to partner with the
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), a national ART professional
organization that had started collecting similar cycle-specific data from its members
in 1986.32 Building on this practice, the CDC’s original contract with SART mandated
that SART perform random validation site visits to reporting clinics.33 In response
to commenters’ concerns about the CDC “ceding its regulatory authority to a private
entity,” the CDC explained that its partnership with SART, and reliance on its existing
data system, would be more efficient than duplicating clinics’ reporting burdens by
creating another reporting system; the CDC emphasized that it would “maintain[]
ultimate control and authority” over the data collection and validation process.34 In
2006, the CDC launched the National ART Surveillance System (NASS) to collect ART
data, though SART member clinics may still report their data to SART, which in turn
reports it to NASS.35 The CDC still refers to SART, as well as the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) (SART’s parent organization), as partners

25

Basically, the number of live births per the number of ovarian stimulation procedures or oocyte
retrieval procedures. FCSRCA § 2(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(b)(2).
26

FCSRCA § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-5.

27

FCSRCA § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-3.

28

Id. § 3(i), 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(i).

29

“The term ‘assisted reproductive technology’ means all treatments or procedures which include
the handling of human oocytes or embryos, including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian
transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer . . . .” FCSRCA § 8(1), 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1).
30

FCSRCA § 8(1), 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1).

31

Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 65
Fed. Reg. 53,310, 53,313 (Sept. 1, 2000).
32

Id. at 53,311.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

National ART Surveillance, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/art/
NASS.htm(last updated July 24, 2012).
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who are involved in framing the surveillance and research questions and
in collecting and reporting data from member clinics. Other important
partners who represent consumers of ART and infertility services include
RESOLVE . . . , the American Fertility Association . . . , and most recently,
Fertile Hope . . . . These organizations provide ongoing consultations about
the ART Report and its use for public health communications and education.36
In addition to the pregnancy success rate data, the CDC also requires that ART clinics
report data on whether they provide ART services to single women, their patients’
ethnicities, and whether they are members of SART, as well as whether the ART clinics
use laboratories that are accredited by three industry accreditation programs.37 The
FCSRCA itself does not mandate collection of any data beyond pregnancy success rates.
In response to commenters’ concerns that ART clinics were being required to report too
much information, the CDC explained that its reporting requirements were developed
“with consideration for the spirit” of the FCSRCA.38 The CDC explained that it was
mandating provision of the information “as a public service” because stakeholders had
indicated that such information is useful and would assist consumers in a “thorough and
complete analysis, which will help in their goal of making an informed decision about
ART.”39 The CDC thus already has a policy of requiring ART clinics to report more
information than the FCSRCA mandates.
B. FDA’s Human Cells, Tissues, & Cellular & Tissue-Based Products Regulation
In 1997, the FDA asserted its authority over donor gametes, along with other human
cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/Ps), when it published
a proposed regulatory scheme for cellular and tissue-based products pursuant to its
regulatory authority over biologics.40 The FDA’s first regulation established a mandatory
registration and listing program for HCT/Ps.41 The FDA employed a “tiered, risk-based
approach . . . to exert only the type of government regulation necessary to protect the
public health.”42 Some HCT/Ps—including donor gametes43—are regulated only to the
extent that they pose a risk of communicable disease transmission under Section 361
of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The FDA regulates other HCT/Ps under a
broader scope of authority as biological products under Section 351 of the PHSA or as

36

Id.

37

Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 65
Fed. Reg. at 53,313.
38

Id. at 53,312.

39

Id.

40

FDA, Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products 6 (1997).

41

See generally Human Cells, Tissues and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment
Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271).
42

Id. at 5448.

43

FDA, Guidance for Industry: Regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and TissueBased Products (HCT/Ps), Small Entity Compliance Guide 4 (2007) (including “reproductive cells
and tissues (e.g., semen, oocytes, embryos)” in its list of HCT/Ps regulated solely under Section 361
of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)).
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drugs or devices under Section 510 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).44
Various ART providers and clinics objected to the FDA’s regulation of donor gametes
given the Fertility Clinic Success Rate Certification Act’s prohibition on regulating
the practice of ART medicine.45 In response, the FDA claimed that this regulation
would not be “duplicative” because the FCSRCA does not focus on the prevention
of communicable disease transmission.46 The second HCT/P regulation established
mandatory screening and testing procedures for tissue donors to prevent communicable
disease transmission.47 Donor gametes must be screened for HIV, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis
C, syphilis, Chlamydia, and gonorrhea; donated sperm must also be screened for Human
T-lymphotropic virus and cytomegalovirus.48 In addition, HCT/P establishments must
conduct a “donor medical history interview” to screen the gamete donor’s medical records
and relevant social behavior for communicable disease risk factors.49 These testing and
screening requirements do not apply to gametes donated for autologous (one’s own) use,
for use by a sexually intimate partner, or to embryos donated by individuals who did
not undergo a donor-eligibility determination50 when they donated the original sperm
or eggs that resulted in the embryo(s).51 If a gamete donor is donating to a specific
person, the FDA does not prohibit that donor from doing so, even if he or she fails the
44

Human Cells, Tissues and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and
Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5448–49; see also Richard A. Merrill, Human Tissues and Reproductive
Cloning: New Technologies Challenge FDA, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 1, 12, 15 (2002) (noting
the expansive statutory definitions of biological products and devices).
45

E.g., Comment on Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products from András Z. Széll, Alta Bates Med. Ctr., to Dockets Mgmt.
Branch, FDA (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA1997-N-0011-0041; Comment on Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of
Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products from Wayne S. Maxson, Nw. Ctr. for Infertility and
Reprod. Endocrinology, to Dockets Mgmt. Branch, FDA (Jan. 13, 1999), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-1997-N-0011-0040. Another fertility doctor’s comment
asserted that the registration requirements should not apply to in vitro fertilization or egg retrieval or
donation because those medical practices involve treating patients, not manufacturing products, and
the FDA does not have the mandate to regulate the practice of medicine. Comment on Establishment
Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products from
Sherman J. Silber to Dockets Mgmt. Branch, FDA (Jan. 8, 1999) available athttp://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-1997-N-0011-0038.
46

Human Cells, Tissues and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and
Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5452–53.
47

Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786 (May 25, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 1271). The FDA’s third
HCT/P regulation established practices and methods for HCT/P manufacture, recordkeeping,
labeling, and reporting. Current Good Tissue Practice for Human Cell, Tissue, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Product Establishments; Inspection and Enforcement, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,612 (Nov. 24,
2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271, subpart D–E).
48

FDA, Compliance Program Guidance Manual: Inspection of Human Cells, Tissues, and
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (HCT/Ps), Attachment C—Donor Testing (2012).
49

FDA, Guidance for Industry: Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues,
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (HCT/Ps) 11 (2007).

and
50

“A conclusion that a donor is either eligible or ineligible to donate cells or tissues to be used in
an HCT/P, based on the results of donor screening . . . and testing . . . .” Id. at 2.
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21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.90(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
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donor-eligibility determination, as long as the clinic ensures the recipient’s informed
consent.52 In summary, the FDA established its intent to regulate donor gametes solely
for the purpose of preventing communicable disease, not to assert authority over ART
procedures themselves.
C. The Donor Gamete Industry
Donor gametes include sperm, eggs, and embryos. Donor sperm is by far the most
common donor gamete because the “low-tech” artificial insemination procedure has
been around for decades.53 However, as medical and storing technology advances,
the donor egg market is increasing.54 Embryo donation for procreation is frequently
offered as an option for unused embryos after an IVF cycle. As of 2003, there were
approximately 400,000 embryos in storage in IVF clinics in the United States.55 While
that number has likely grown over the past decade, only about two percent, or 8,000 of
those 400,000 embryos, were designated for donation for procreation.56 My proposal
for a donor gamete registry includes sperm, egg, and embryo donors because all three
types raise the same policy concerns.57 Before addressing these concerns, it is useful to
understand the basics of the egg and sperm donor markets.
The egg and sperm donor markets are very selective. Sperm banks claim that they accept
only one to two percent of men who apply,58 while egg banks reject over eighty percent
of applicants.59 Most sperm banks, in addition to requiring that donors have high sperm
counts to survive the cryogenic freezing process, require donors to “be between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-eight, be a minimum height (usually around 5’8”), have a college
degree or be a currently enrolled college student, not use tobacco or alcohol heavily, and
be able to make weekly visits to the sperm bank to donate for some minimum period.”60
Most sperm and egg donors are young, single, and White.61 Sperm donors are usually
college-educated, while egg donors “have lower levels of education and socioeconomic
status than do sperm donors, and are more likely to have children of their own.”62
52

Id. §1271.65(b)(1)(ii).

53

Cf. Susan L. Crockin & Howard W. Jones, Legal Conceptions: The Evolving Law and Policy of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies 133 (2010) (noting that “both legislatures and courts have had
decades of experience” dealing with the legal issues surrounding sperm donation.
54

Almeling, The Unregulated Sperm Industry, supra note 18 (“Now that scientists have figured out
how to successfully freeze eggs, egg banks are being established, and the scale of production may
eventually lead to the same challenges sperm banks face.”).
55

David I. Hoffman et al. Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Availability for
Research, 79 Fertility & Sterility 1063, 1066 (2003).
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Id.
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See infra Part III.
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Bleyer, supra note 6, at 82.
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Rene Elmeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical
Market in Genetic Material, 72 Am. Soc. Review 319, 328 (2007) [hereinafter Almeling, Selling
Genes, Selling Gender].
60

Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market,
72 Law & Contemporary Problems 59, 69 (2009).
61

Id.
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Id. at 64, 69.

Conceiving a National Gamete Donor Registry

35

Because the pool of eligible sperm donors is so small, sperm banks require men to donate
sperm over a period of time, usually nine months to a year, “resulting in large caches
of genetic material that can produce tens and perhaps even hundreds of offspring.”63
Receiving around $75 per donation, which they make one to two times per week, sperm
donors can make over $7,000 over the course of a year.64 Men cite financial motivations
as their primary incentive to donate.65 Women, on the other hand, cite altruism as their
principal motivation.66 Women are paid more than men per donation—typically $5,000
per donation—because the egg extraction process is much more intrusive and carries
health risks.67 Regardless of a donor’s motivation, current FDA regulatory procedures
prohibit gamete banks from sharing information about each other’s donors,68 creating a
loophole that allows a man to donate to multiple sperm banks.69
D. The Donor Sibling Registry
The CDC’s and FDA’s regulatory authority over ART does not currently extend to after
the birth of a child70 or, in the case of gamete donors, to after that donation occurs.71
Children conceived with donor gametes are limited in their ability to track down gamete
donors or connect to other people born with the same donor gamete(s) because ART
clinics may close down, lose records, or simply not provide post-birth services.72 Wendy
Kramer, the mother of a child conceived with donor sperm, founded the Donor Sibling
Registry (DSR) in 2000 to fill this gap.
The DSR allows individuals conceived with donor gametes to “make mutually desired
contact with others with whom they share genetic ties.”73 Donor-conceived children or
gamete donors can, for a small fee, become members of the DSR, then affiliate with
a gamete bank or fertility clinic and provide their “donor number” (the ID number
63

Almeling, The Unregulated Sperm Industry, supra note 18. See also Krawiec, supra note 59, at
69 (stating that the typical time commitment for sperm donors is nine months).
64

Rene Almeling, “Why Do You Want to Be a Donor?”: Gender and the Production of Altruism
in Egg and Sperm Donation, 25 New Genetics & Soc’y 143, 144 (2006) [hereinafter Almeling,
Why Do You Want to Be a Donor] (noting that men must sign a contract agreeing to “abstain[] from
sexual activity for 48 hours before each visit”). But see Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender,
supra note 58, at 320 (“[M]en are paid only for samples deemed acceptable based on sperm count
and quality, things that can be negatively affected by stress, sickness, or having abstained for fewer
than 48 hours.”).
65

Almeling, Why Do You Want to Be a Donor, supra note 63, at 143.

66

Id.

67

Id. at 144 (“For these fees, women take fertility medications and undergo outpatient surgery, a
process that is usually complete in about six weeks.”).
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See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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See Judith Daar, Federalizing Embryo Transfers: Taming the Wild West of Reproductive
Medicine?, 23 Colum. J. Gender & L. 257, 262–63 (2012) (noting that CDC measures ART success
by rates of pregnancies and live births).
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21 C.F.R. § 1271.55 (2012) (outlining the records that must accompany a gamete donation).
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See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
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Our History and Mission, Donor Sibling Registry, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/aboutdsr/history-and-mission (last visited Nov. 5, 2013)
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associated with the donor that the clinic shares with intended parents). The DSR
“matches” children to their donors or their genetic half-siblings through the donor
numbers. The DSR has over 41,600 members and has facilitated contact between more
than 10,700 genetic relatives.74 Participation in the DSR, a non-profit organization, is
completely voluntary, so membership is not comprehensive, and depends on those who
know that the DSR exists and are willing to pay the membership fee.75 A national,
mandatory registry is necessary to centralize donor gamete information to guarantee
a unified system of the most essential information that clinics are mandated by law to
collect and report to the FDA and CDC.

III. P
 OLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NATIONAL GAMETE
DONOR REGISTRY
Academics and policymakers point to three justifications for a national, mandatory
gamete donor registry: (1) to standardize information and requirements across states
and the private industry, particularly regarding a nationwide limit on the number of
gamete donations or resulting pregnancies per donor; (2) to increase access to donors’
medical information beyond the snapshot provided at the time of donation; and (3) to
recognize the benefits of knowing one’s genetic origins, which include connecting with
genetic half-siblings and preventing accidental incest. While scholars generally frame
these three points around the child’s perspective, they also acknowledge the privacy
interests of the donors and parents. I will explore these points in greater detail below.
A. Standardizing Donor Information & Requirements Across States & Industry
The FDA’s regulations on donor gametes and the CDC’s requirements pursuant to the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate & Certification Act (FCSRCA) are supplemented by state
and industry regulation.76 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART)
requires that member clinics, which represent over 90% of U.S. fertility clinics,77 adhere
not only to state medical licensing requirements, but also to SART’s ethics and practice

74

Donor Sibling Registry, supra note 16.

75

The California Cryobank, one of the country’s largest gamete banks, runs a similar registry for its
clients. Participation is optional; those who enroll have access to half-siblings’ profiles and contact
information. Sibling Registry, Cal. Cryobank, http://www.cryobank.com/Services/Sibling-Registry/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013). Genetisafe is another company that provides “donor profile storage,
updated donor genetic and health information, and facilitated anonymous communication with the
donor” if amenable. Genetisafe, LLC, http://genetisafe.com/frmAcceptAgreement.aspx (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013).
76

Prac. Comm., Am. Soc’y Reprod. Med. & Prac. Comm., Soc’y Assisted Reprod. Tech.,
Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Committee Opinion 2 (2012) (“In some
instances, the federal [HCT/P] requirements may be less rigorous than those in the state in which an
individual practice is located or than those recommended by ASRM and . . . SART.”) [hereinafter
Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation]. See also Messing, supra note 14, at 440
(“Some of the major criticisms of the FDA regulations are: (1) the lack of a requirement for genetic
testing; (2) the lack of limitations on the number of times one person can donate and a limitation on
the number of live births per donor; and (3) the lack of a network for tracking the children actually
conceived as a result of these donations.”).
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Am. Soc’y Reprod. Med., Oversight of Assisted Reproductive Technology 9 (2010).
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committee guidelines.78 These guidelines encourage clinics to limit the number of
pregnancies resulting from each donor; however, SART refrains from setting a firm
limit given the regional variation in population and geography:
It is difficult to provide a precise number of times that a given donor can
be used because one must take into consideration the population base from
which the donor is selected and the geographic area that may be served by a
given donor. It has been suggested that in a population of 800,000, limiting a
single donor to no more than 25 births would avoid any significant increased
risk of inadvertent consanguineous conception. This suggestion may require
modification if the population using donor insemination represents an isolated
subgroup or if the specimens are distributed over a wide geographic area.79
Comparing the practices of the Fairfax Cryobank and the California Cryobank, two of
the largest sperm banks in the United States,80 demonstrates how sperm banks vary in
their approach to limits on the number of pregnancies from a single donor. The Fairfax
Cryobank limits sales of a donor’s sperm when twenty-five children are born from
that donor in the United States (though it will distribute further donations for “sibling
pregnancies”).81 The California Cryobank, on the other hand, is more cryptic about its
limitations, stating on its website that it “has taken steps to resolve concerns regarding
the number of live births per sperm donor. Each donor is limited by the length of time he
remains active in the program. Most donors remain in the program anywhere between
12 and 18 months.”82 Thus it is unclear exactly how California Cryobank limits a donor’s
sales, or whether there is even a limit of sales per live births at all.
A determined gamete donor could circumvent SART’s non-binding guidelines83 by
donating to multiple clinics (as the sperm donor in the Slate column did).84 The current
regulatory scheme does not allow ART clinics to share information with each other about
individual gamete donors.85 A national, mandatory gamete donor registry would prevent
this practice because each clinic would have access to that individual’s donor history

78

Id.

79

Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 75, at 53. Cahn warns that
these advisory limits may not be sufficient given American mobility. Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra
note 2, at 83.
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Gina Kolata, Psst! Ask for Donor 1913, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18kolata.ART.html?_r=0.
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Limitations on Donor Births, Fairfax Cryobank, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/ReadFirst.
shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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California Cryobank Policy of Openness, Cal. Cryobank, http://www.spermbank.com/
newdonors/index.cfm?ID=6 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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Cahn, Necessary Subjects, supra note 7, at 213.
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Dennison, supra note 3, at 16.
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See infra Part III.B about federal regulation of protected health information. Cf. Nanette R.
Elster & Andrea Braverman, The Future Is Now: A Voluntary Gamete Donor Registry is Feasible, 12
DePaul J. Health Care L. 195, 197 (2009) (noting that a centralized donor gamete registry “would
enable ART programs to share information with one another about donors”).
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across all ART clinics.86 Great Britain’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
requires that all ART clinics report information on all donor cycles, including a donor’s
identifying information and the outcome of any treatment.87 A firmer, nationwide limit
on gamete donations would lower the risk of accidental incest88 and minimize disease
transmission associated with a particular donor.89
B. Broader Access to Medical History
Intended parents have access to the medical history that the donor provides to the
clinic. However, this information is not comprehensive because clinics cannot screen
donors for “every known genetic condition,”90 nor are they required to do so because
FDA’s authority over donor gametes is limited to preventing communicable disease
transmission. Furthermore, donors’ medical history is not necessarily updated after
donation,91 and clinics’ recordkeeping practices vary widely.92 ART clinics do not
communicate with a donor’s primary care doctor, and there is no mechanism in place
that requires donors or resulting offspring to update the clinic when they discover new
medical conditions that could impact their genetic relative(s).93 Genetic history is
becoming increasingly important in disease diagnosis and treatment.94 A gamete donor
registry could preserve donor medical information, allow donors to update their medical
86

Clinics could be required to collect social security numbers or other individually identifying
information. Cf. Cahn, Necessary Subjects, supra note 7, at 218 (“A federal-level structure could
more efficiently and effectively implement any large-scale collection of information and oversight of
the process.”).
87

Directions Given Under the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990 as Amended, Hum.
Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2009-06-03_GENERAL_
DIRECTIONS_0005_Collecting_and_recording_information_for_the_HFEA_-_approved.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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Dennison, supra note 3, at 16.
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See Cahn, Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 2, at 102–03 (noting that five children in Michigan
conceived by the same sperm donor share the “extremely rare disease of congenital neutropenia”).
This limit would also mitigate the health risks associated with repeated egg donation. Id. at 99–100.
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long-form medical history,’ says Dr. Cappy Rothman, who founded the California Cryobank in
1976.”).
91

See Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 75, at 7 (noting that clinics
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later on).
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donors fail to update the clinic with their medical history as they age and new conditions emerge);
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history themselves after donation, allow children conceived with donor gametes to
update relevant genetic information or medical history for the benefit of their donor
or their genetic half-siblings, and ensure the availability of this information, even if
individual clinics or providers terminate their practice or lose touch with the donors or
clients.95 In the case of egg donation, a registry could track the procedure’s long-term
health effects on the donor, which are still unknown.96
C. Psychological Benefits of Knowing Genetic Origins & Half-Siblings
Professor Vardit Ravitsky notes that the “first generation of donor-conceived offspring is
now becoming young adults who are beginning to share their unique perspectives. Many
are telling a story of psychological distress. They describe a strong need to know ‘where
they came from;’ to know their genetic origins as an essential part of constructing their
identities.”97 This emerging need to know one’s genetic origins shares similarities with
adopted children’s’ advocacy around liberalizing adoption records.98
In the gamete donor context, Professor Naomi Cahn has noted that the “need to know”
has two parts: the need to know that one was conceived through donor gametes, and the
need to know the donor’s identity,99 which is broader than a need to know for medical
decisionmaking purposes.100 Professor Ravitsky explains this need as follows:
The biological aspect of our connection to our past provides a sense of
continuity. As we develop a sense of personal identity we constantly refer to
‘where we come from’ as a way of grounding ourselves, establishing a sense
of belonging, or our place in the world. Lack of knowledge about the donor
as a person could thus create a gap or a void in the formation of personal
identity, undermine a sense of continuity and grounding, and lead to troubling
and disruptive feelings of completeness.101
However, even this “need to know” does not necessarily have to include a donor’s
identifying information. It could be at least partially satisfied by knowing a donor’s
physical and genetic traits, ethnic ancestry, and other facts, such as education, profession,
and interests. In fact, most donor gamete banks already collect this information from
donors, which intended parents use to decide which donor’s gametes to purchase.102
95

Benward et al., supra note 11, at 230. See also Messing, supra note 14, at 455 (“A voluntary
medical-update system would provide a happy medium for donor-conceived children with a need for
the information and donors who still wish to remain anonymous.”).
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Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 Hastings Women’s L.J. 187, 229
(2011).
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Ravitsky, supra note 89, at 665. See also Benward et al., supra note 11, at 232–34 (explaining the
cultural importance of genetic ties for identity formation).
98
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Given that intended parents value this information, it is unsurprising that resulting
offspring do as well.103
This “need to know” is not limited to a child’s genetic parent; the original purpose
of the DSR was to connect genetic half-siblings that shared the same donor.104 A
donor gamete registry can allow half-siblings to connect without revealing a donor’s
identifying information. While mandating donor identity disclosure is controversial, the
SART notes “it is widely agreed that such release is acceptable if all parties agree.”105
D. Protecting Donors’ and Parents’ Privacy Rights & Choices
Various academics have noted that requiring parents to tell their children that they were
conceived as a result of gamete donation would not only be difficult to enforce, but
could also raise constitutional concerns regarding reproductive choice, family privacy,
and child-rearing.106 No jurisdiction in the world currently mandates that parents tell
their children that they were conceived by donor gametes, so one’s “need to know” only
arises if parents disclose their use of donor gametes.107 While SART recommends that
parents of children born from donor gametes share the circumstances of their children’s
conception with them, SART recognizes that this is ultimately the parents’ choice.108
Prohibiting anonymous donation could overstate the role of genetics and discount
the existing bonds between a child and his actual parents.109 This emphasis would be
particularly problematic for LGBT advocates working to minimize the legal importance
of genetic connections to secure equal parenting rights and responsibilities for parents
with no genetic or gestational connection to their children.110 While a national donor
gamete registry would clearly be beneficial for increasing access to medical history and
hair texture, blood type, educational level, areas of study, ethnic origin, ancestry, religion, and
celebrity “look-a-likes”). Fairfax Cryobank allows consumers to search by, among other factors,
astrological sign, favorite subject, favorite pet, personal goals, talent, and “FaceMatch,” which
matches an intended parent’s and a donor’s facial features. Donor Search, Fairfax Cryobank, http://
donorsearch.fairfaxcryobank.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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knowing one’s genetic origins, it should not cross the line of unnecessary state intrusion
into health and family privacy.

IV. H
 HS RELIANCE ON ELECTRONIC HEALTH DATA & HEALTH
PRIVACY OVERSIGHT
Just as the ART industry and its users are trending toward increasing openness, access
to clinical trial and patient or product registry data has also become more publicly
available.111 Consequently, creating a national donor gamete registry would be a
modest reform that fits into the current atmosphere of creating electronic systems that
increase access to important health data. The rise of electronic health records and human
subject research data means that the federal government already has the technical
skills and systems necessary to safeguard the privacy of participants’ protected health
information.112 Outside the ART context, federal involvement and regulation have joined
this trend toward transparency. For example, the White House’s Office of Science and
Technology Policy issued a memorandum in February 2013 instructing agency heads
to expand public access to data in federally funded projects.113 In June of this year, the
FDA published a notice and request for comment on a proposal to make available deidentified and masked clinical data from medical product applications.114
A national donor gamete registry brings many of the same benefits as those associated
with increased access to clinical research data and product registries in general.
Researchers and policymakers argue that public access to such data increases public
confidence in clinical research, improves drug and product safety and effectiveness,
advances scientific development and innovation, and mitigates individual participant
risk.115 However, increasing access to human subject research data also has its downsides:
the difficulty of guaranteeing participants’ privacy; the potential of poorly conducted, but
widely publicized, data analyses that could mislead the public; the possible reduction of
incentives for competition and innovation; and the potential to overwhelm regulators
and increase costs associated with monitoring data systems.116 HHS’s participation in
patient or product registries takes many forms, though it usually does not hold registry
or study data exclusively, preferring to work with private or academic partners and

Lesbian Rts., http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_
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whether the privacy of research participants can be guaranteed”).
113

Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., Office Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec. Office President, to
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limiting its role to providing guidance or best practices.117 I recommend a similar
public-private collaboration for the national donor gamete registry, which can build on
the best practices of patient and product registries.
A. E
 xamples of HHS Involvement in Clinical Trials & Patient &
Product Registries
The 1997 Food and Drug Modernization Act (FDAMA) was the first federal law
mandating that the NIH “operate a data bank of information on clinical trials for drugs for
serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions.”118 The NIH must collect information
about federally and privately funded clinical trials for experimental treatments (drug and
biological products) for patients with serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions,
including the purpose of each experimental drug, patient eligibility criteria, the location
of clinical trial sites, and a point of contact for patients wanting to enroll in the trial.119
The NIH and the FDA implemented this mandate by developing Clinicaltrials.gov,
which debuted on February 29, 2000.120 Clinicaltrials.gov represents a centralized
approach to data management, where private researchers and companies are required
to submit information to the federal government. I suggest a similar centralized system
for a national donor gamete registry, where ART clinics would submit data to a unified
government system.
The FDA’s approach to pregnancy exposure registries has been more permissive.
The agency defines a pregnancy exposure registry as “a study that collects health
information from women who take medicines or vaccines when they are
pregnant.”121 Its website contains a page titled “List of Pregnancy Exposure Registries,”
where users can search for registries by medical condition or by drug or vaccine. The
FDA notes that the agency does not run any of these registries but invites companies
that want their registry listed on the cite to contact the FDA Office of Women’s Health.
In 2002, the FDA released guidance on how to establish pregnancy exposure registries.
This guidance notes that a sponsor is free to establish a pregnancy exposure registry on
its own at any time; the FDA may also require that the sponsor establish such a registry
“under an IND [investigational new drug procedure] before approval or, more typically,
as part of a phase 4 commitment [a post-market study required by FDA as a condition of

117
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public-private partnerships”). See also Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Registries
for Evaluating Patient Outcomes: A User’s Guide 1 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the purpose of the
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drug approval].”122 If the registry records a serious or unexpected adverse event where
it is reasonably probable that the drug or product caused that event, the company must
report that event to the FDA within fifteen calendar days.123
In other words, even if the FDA requires that a company establish a pregnancy exposure
registry, the company still has discretion as to how the registry should be run. This
approach is arguably already in place in the donor gamete registry realm, given that the
Sibling Donor Gamete Registry, as well as other private registries run by individuals or
sperm clinics, each runs separate systems that do not communicate with each other. This
lack of communication is one of the obstacles that a single donor gamete registry would
overcome, making it easier to enforce a nationwide limit on pregnancies per donor.
In addition to tracking particular drugs, other registries track medical devices. In 2011,
the FDA shared the results of its internal review of breast implants and a possible
association with anaplastic large cell lymphoma (ALCL). In its news release, the FDA
announced that it is working with the American Society of Plastic Surgeons and others
to create a breast implant registry to improve understanding of this association. In the
meantime, the FDA encourages health care providers to report any confirmed ALCL
cases. Even though two of the largest breast implant manufacturing companies support
the idea of a registry, the FDA and the industry have not been able to agree on who
will cover the costs of the registry, whether participation will be mandatory, and related
privacy issues.124 The delay in creating a breast implant registry demonstrates the need
to carefully think through the cost, participation, and privacy implications of a donor
gamete registry.
The NIH has had more success establishing DS-Connect, the Down Syndrome Registry
that launched in September 2013. DS-Connect allows “people with Down syndrome and
their family members, researchers, and parent and support groups to share information
and health history in a safe, confidential, online database.”125 Users may choose to make
their contact information available to researchers for participation in research studies
but are not required to do so to create a DS-Connect profile.126 The NIH de-identifies
the data stored in the registry and only shares the data, with users’ permission, with
approved scientists, clinicians, and drug companies.127 The NIH Down Syndrome
Consortium, a coalition of government officials, researchers, and Down Syndrome
advocates, recommended a national registry in 2007 as a vehicle to help achieve general
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Down Syndrome research goals.128 The NIH justified its authority to create DS-Connect
by pointing to congressional directives in the FY2007 House and Senate Appropriations
Committee Reports for Labor–HHS–Education.129 While Down Syndrome advocacy
organizations are generally supportive of DS-Connect, individuals have expressed
skepticism about the potential for abuse and stigmatization of an already vulnerable
population.130 DS-Connect’s experiences could be relevant for a national donor gamete
registry, particularly regarding whether donors and offspring would want to make
their data accessible to researchers. The social stigma surrounding infertility, single
parenthood, and LGBT families is also something to keep in mind when considering
opening this data to the public.131
Different agencies, along with states and non-profit organizations, can also jointly
manage a registry. The NIH and CDC are working together to launch a Sudden Death
in the Young Registry. This registry will not be limited to a particular condition; rather,
its scope is broad to try to fill the knowledge gap around why sudden death occurs
among infants and children.132 State public health agencies will apply to participate,
and the Michigan Public Health Institute will manage the data. Blood samples from a
subset of cases will also be collected; the data will not contain personally identifiable
information.133 The collaboration between the CDC, the NIH, and a non-governmental
third party provides a model for how the FDA and the CDC could partner with the
ASRM to establish a donor gamete registry.
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Following FDAMA, Congress has continued to play a role in expanding access to clinical
trial and health registry data. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 (FDAAA) created a nationwide health care data network, the Sentinel Initiative, “to
track the safety of drugs, biologics, and medical devices once they reach the market.”134
The Sentinel Initiative will allow FDA “to query multiple data environments” concerning
potential product safety problems while effectively managing privacy and security to
augment the agency’s current surveillance capabilities.”135 However, the original owners
will still hold and manage the data, and the FDA, through its contractors, will only
able to access de-identified information.136 Potential sources of this health data include
the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, the healthcare exchanges created pursuant to the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
private insurance companies, and state agencies, among others.137 The sheer volume
of available data that could be included in the Sentinel Initiative, along with the fact
that the FDA will “engage private-sector companies to develop and operate the system
infrastructure,” has raised health privacy and security concerns that are also relevant to
any decisions regarding the establishment of a national donor gamete registry.138
B. HIPAA Implications of Increased Patient & Product Surveillance
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established
federal privacy protections for individually identifiable health information.139 HHS
implemented HIPAA by promulgating the Privacy Rule, which sets national protection
standards for the “confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected
health information” that bind health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers.140 Thus, the Privacy Rule covers health care research concerning human
subjects and their medical records, and would apply to the medical information included
in a national donor gamete registry.
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The Privacy Rule covers any patient information that is identifiable. That information
is considered “protected health information,”141 and patients must authorize its release
for use in a research study.142 The Privacy Rule does not cover de-identified health
records.143 Covered entities are in the “safe harbor” and patient records are considered
“de-identified” if they remove eighteen specific items from patient records.144 However,
many experts acknowledge that de-identification procedures are not foolproof.145 The
national donor gamete registry would include protected health information, and thus
would be subject to the Privacy Rule.
In addition to the Privacy Rule, HHS administers the HIPAA Security Rule for
electronically stored health information.146 The Security Rule requires a variety of
safeguards, but only applies to health plans, clearinghouses, and providers, not to
researchers.147 The Security Rule does not cover de-identified records databases that
meet the Privacy Rule’s safe harbor standards.148 Because the national donor gamete
registry would be an online registry, it would be subject to the Security Rule in addition
to the Privacy Rule.
Researchers can get around the general requirement for patient authorization of
protected health information by requesting a waiver from an Institutional Review Board
or privacy board (collectively referred to as “IRB”).149 Under the “research purposes”
exception, an IRB may grant a waiver if protected health information is necessary for
research purposes.150 In addition, the use of protected health information cannot involve
more than a “minimal risk to the privacy of individuals.”151 The “research purposes”
exception would be relevant if a national donor gamete registry allowed users to make
their identifying information available to approved researchers, similar to DS-Connect.
Another exception to the Privacy Rule that is relevant to donor gamete registries is
the public health exception, which allows covered entities to disclose protected health
information without a patient’s authorization for “public health activities and purposes.”
141
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Cite? The public health exception includes reports for public health surveillance,
investigations, interventions authorized by law, or at the direction of a public health
authority.152 This exception would potentially be relevant for any person on the registry
who discovered a medical condition that could impact his genetic relatives. For example,
if Ann Morriss’s son was a user on a national donor gamete registry, he could report that
his donor was a genetic carrier of MCADD, alerting the donor and any genetic halfsiblings.153 Covered entities rely on this exception to provide data to an FDA-regulated
manufacturer.154 Any national gamete donor registry will have to comply with the
Privacy Rule and the Security Rule and not exceed the scope of the federal government’s
regulatory authority.

V. PROPOSAL: A TIERED GAMETE DONOR REGISTRY
To comply with the Privacy Rule and remain within the bounds of the federal government’s
existing regulatory authority, I propose a tiered gamete donor registry under the joint
authority of the FDA and the CDC. Tier I will provide a mandatory floor for disclosure,
but gamete donors may choose to share more information by participating in Tiers II
through IV. This tiered approach complements the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (SART) Ethics Committee’s categorization of gamete donor information
sharing into four levels: (1) non-identifying information, (2) non-identifying contact for
medical updates, (3) non-identifying personal information, and (4) identifying personal
information.155 Participation in the donor gamete registry would be limited to those
who make donations through a gamete bank; the proposed registry would not require
participation of those who donate gametes to a specific person because such donors
already have relationships with their donees.
A. Tier I
Tier I would mandate that all ART clinics upload to the registry all donors’ health
and screening information that clinics already collect pursuant to FDA regulations. In
addition, clinics would be obligated to disclose the number of times a donor’s gametes
are used for conception, as well as the conception and pregnancy outcomes. Tier I would
prohibit any ART clinic from selling a donor’s gametes after that donation resulted in a
certain number of successful pregnancies.156
Each donor would have an individual code that clinics would share with intended
parents. Children would be able to view the donor’s registry profile and “link” to it
to identify themselves as offspring to connect to their genetic half-siblings. Children
could also update the profile by listing their own relevant medical information.157 In
addition, donors could decide whether their data could be used for research purposes, or
152

Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i).

153

See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.

154

Evans, Ethics of Postmarketing Observational Studies, supra note 133, at 589.

155

Ethics Comm., Am. Soc’y Reprod. Med., Interests, Obligations, and Rights of the Donor in
Gamete Donation Table 1 (2008) hereinafter Donor Interests, Obligations, and Rights].
156

I refrain from suggesting a specific numerical limit, preferring to defer to scientific authorities
for the proper number.
157

48

Parents would be authorized to create profiles on behalf of their children.

Health Law & Policy Brief • Volume 9, Issue 1 • Spring 2015

be only accessible to parents who purchased donor gametes and thus have their donor
code. Data available for research purposes would not include individually identifiable
information, and thus would not raise HIPAA compliance concerns.
Tier I’s requirements would not extend much further than what is already required. The
Fertility Clinic Success Rate & Certification Act (FCSCRA) mandates that ART clinics
report conception and pregnancy outcomes for ART procedures using donated eggs and
embryos. As mentioned earlier, the CDC already requires clinics to report more data
than the specific categories mentioned in the statute. Furthermore, HHS already has the
authority to amend the “pregnancy success rate” definition to include ART procedures
using donated sperm.158 The FDA’s human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based
products (HCT/P) regulations already require gamete donors to undergo specific testing
and screening procedures;159 the only additional step would be that clinics would have
to enter this data into a database that tracked donors across the country.
Professor Ravitsky notes that “drawing the policy line at the level of medical history and
genetic information emphasizes the biomedical meaning of inheritability.”160 In other
words, greater access to a donor’s medical history is justifiable without the danger of
essentializing the importance of genetic ties for other aspects of identity formation.161
Furthermore, because donors are already required to disclose medical information to
their individual clinic, pooling it with other clinics’ records does not further intrude on
donor privacy, but does limit the possibility of donors circumventing individual clinic
donation limits and producing a large number of pregnancies.
B. Tier II
Tier II would allow donors the option of disclosing additional, non-medical history
and physical characteristics. The largest sperm clinics already collect much of this
information and disclose it to intended parents at various fee levels. This information
includes a donor’s race, education, and profession, as well as baby pictures, a recording
of a donor’s voice, and the clinic’s impressions of a donor. If donors consented to
sharing some or all of this information, the clinic would share this information with the
registry along with the information mandated by Tier I. Again, sharing this information
could satisfy some donor-conceived children’s need for further information without
compromising donor anonymity,162 and it would relieve the individual clinic of being
the steward of this information in perpetuity. Neither the FDA nor the CDC’s current
regulatory authority over ART extends to these characteristics, so this tier must remain
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voluntary. Because this information is not protected health information that raises the
risk of individual identification, it does not raise any HIPAA concerns.
C. Tier III
If donors chose to opt for Tier III, they would provide a more complete medical history
beyond what the FDA currently collects to assess risk of communicable disease
transmission. In addition, donors could update the registry with their health information
and medical history post-donation. This would allow intended parents to make more
informed choices when considering which donor gametes to purchase, and would let
children conceived with donor gametes to stay continuously apprised of their donors’
post-donation medical information even after donation occurred.
SART already recommends that donors provide medical updates when appropriate;163
however, the FDA does not currently have the legal authority to mandate this information
because its scope is limited to risk of communicable disease exposure and transmission
prior to donation, and does not include authority over genetic disease prevention.164
While the CDC already exercises considerable discretion under the FCSRCA by
requesting more information that the statute requires, it is unlikely that this discretion
could be reasonably interpreted to require individual donors to update their medical
history post-donation because this information is not rationally related to the narrow
definition of “pregnancy success rates.” The purpose of mandating increased disclosure
of medical information is not limited to the success of the pregnancies themselves, but
rather focuses on the quality of life for the child that results from the pregnancy.
Because neither the CDC nor the FDA currently has the authority to mandate donors to
update their information post-donation, this option must remain voluntary. Nonetheless,
market forces could play a role in encouraging post-donation medical updates. Clinics
could incentivize Tier III by providing higher compensation to or only accepting Tier
III donors. The sperm bank industry is already engaged in a donor profile “arms race,”
where banks feel pressure to add more demographic information about the donor to
keep up with the competition.165 Again, providing medical history, without revealing
individual identifying information, would not intrude on donor privacy or raise HIPAA
concerns.
D. Tier IV
Tier IV, the highest level of disclosure, would allow the registry to make donors’
identifying information available to any resulting offspring that requested it upon
reaching eighteen. While neither the FDA nor the CDC has the current authority to
require “open donation,” this option is already becoming increasingly popular at sperm
163
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and egg banks.166 Given the regulatory limitations as well as the privacy policy concerns,
this tier would need to be voluntary.

VI. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR REGISTRY
As stated previously, my tiered proposal would be a modest step forward because only
the first tier would be mandatory, and the federal government already imposes these
requirements or has the authority to do so. While many advocate for more binding
disclosure requirements, Tiers II through IV would be voluntary so that the FDA
and CDC would not have to assert additional authority or wait for Congress to pass
legislation to establish a donor gamete registry. Once the donor gamete registry was in
use, if Tiers II through IV became popular and stakeholders advocated for these tiers to
become binding, the executive or legislative branches could respond appropriately with
incremental disclosure requirements.
A. Current FDA Jurisdiction
As previously described in Part II.B, the FDA currently has authority over donor gametes
pursuant to its authority under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act. Scholars
note that while the FDA has broad discretion over how to pursue communicable disease
prevention, the goal itself is narrow, and in the ART context, does not provide authority
to regulate cloning or genetic diseases.167 As such, FDA has looked beyond its powers to
prevent communicable disease transmission to assert its authority over specific, cuttingedge ART procedures by classifying them as clinical drug investigations.
In 2001, the FDA asserted authority over “human cells used in therapy involving the
transfer of genetic material by means other than the union of gamete nuclei” by deeming
any such transfer a “clinical investigation” that required submission of an Investigational
New Drug (IND) application.168 This description included ooplasm transfer, where
donor ooplasm (cytoplasm of an egg)169 is injected into infertile eggs along with sperm
to aid fertilization and embryonic development,170 nuclear transfer, where doctors take
nuclei from infertile eggs and transfer them to enucleated donor eggs and then fertilized
166
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with sperm,171 and reproductive cloning.172 The FDA referred to earlier notice of its
authority over somatic cells and gene therapy products to support its regulatory power
over these transfers.173 In that 1993 notice,174 the FDA explained that somatic cellular
therapies were biologics, subject to the product license application process, and drugs,
subject to the new drug application process and current good manufacturing practices.175
As for gene therapy, the FDA stated that products containing modified genetic material
for therapeutic purposes are also biologics or drugs requiring product license or new
drug applications.176
Scholars’ reactions are mixed over the FDA’s increasing involvement in the ART field.
For example, Professor Macintosh argues that the FDA’s analogy to its power over
drugs, even biological drugs, is “extremely weak” because these transfers, unlike gene
therapy, are not transferred “directly into patients,” but rather into “unfertilized eggs
that are not human beings.”177 Others advocate that the FDA should go even further and
screen donor gametes for genetic disease as part of its mandate “to ensure the safety and
efficacy of biologics” under Section 351 of PHSA.178 While the debate over the FDA’s
legal authority to regulate cutting-edge ART procedures is beyond the scope of this
article, the FDA’s recent actions demonstrate that the agency is increasingly involving
itself in ART procedures, and thus its collaboration in setting up a national donor gamete
registry with the CDC and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine would
not represent a novel incursion into the ART industry.179 Furthermore, establishing
a donor gamete registry is arguably less intrusive into the realm of the practice of
medicine because a registry merely records data. Besides setting a limit on the number
of pregnancies associated with each donor, the registry would not impose any other new
requirements on ART clinical practices.
Of course, the most common donor gamete is sperm, and artificial insemination with
donated sperm is actually the one of the most low-tech ART procedures180 and does
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not require medical intervention.181 Because the FDA cannot claim that artificial
insemination is a clinical investigation or a new drug, the FDA does not have sufficient
regulatory power to create a donor gamete registry on its own. For this reason, partnership
with the CDC, which has broader authority over ART procedures, is necessary to
establish the registry.
B. CDC Authority
Unlike the FDA, the CDC already has the necessary authority to establish a donor
gamete registry and mandate the Tier I requirements. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate
& Certification Act (FCSRCA) delegated to HHS the authority to amend the definition
of ART through notice-and-comment procedures,182 so the CDC could broaden this
definition to include artificial insemination with anonymous donor sperm. Doing so
would require that clinics performing these procedures would also have to report their
pregnancy success rates.
As for the definition of “pregnancy success rates,” the FCSRCA also allows HHS to
amend this definition in consultation with ART consumer and professional organizations.
Congress directed the Secretary to consider “the effect of success rates of age,
diagnosis, and other significant factors.”183 Thus the CDC, in consultation with these
stakeholders, could revise its regulations to include the Tier I requirements.184 Scholars
have already criticized the CDC’s narrow definition of pregnancy success rates. For
example, Professor Judith Daar notes the incongruity of the ART system: “while [ART
procedures] are directed at patients, outcomes are measured by the well-being of any
resulting children . . . the birth of a healthy ART child is not necessarily a sign of health
in the ART system.”185 Thus, it is likely that stakeholders would support amending the
definition of pregnancy success rates to enable the CDC to work with the FDA to gather
more the Tier I data—donors’ health and screening information, including the number
of times a donor’s gametes are used for conception and the donor’s conception and
pregnancy outcomes—and make this available to donors and families through a registry.
As stated earlier, the CDC’s regulatory discretion does have its limits, especially
concerning medical events following pregnancy, which is why only the first tier of the
registry would be mandatory. These limits, especially when coupled with the FDA’s
regulatory authority over donor gametes that is limited to prevention of communicable
181
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disease transmission, demonstrate the need for the FDA and the CDC to form a publicprivate partnership with an entity like SART to establish a donor gamete registry.
C. National Donor Gamete Registry: A Public-Private Partnership
While the FDA and CDC would only have to undertake modest regulatory revisions
to create a donor gamete registry with Tier I requirements, their authority, even when
considered jointly, does not extend past Tier I. If HHS stopped there and only created
a donor gamete registry with these requirements, many of the policies justifying the
registry would not be realized. For example, because neither FDA nor the CDC has
authority once the donation or pregnancy occurs, parents and donor-conceived children
would not be able to benefit from broader access to medical history. Tier IV would
certainly not be an option because facilitating connections between donor-conceived
children and their genetic relatives is outside the scope of the FDA’s and the CDC’s
limited authority. Thus, creating a donor gamete registry solely within the bounds of
current HHS regulatory authority would not be worth the effort.
However, if the FDA and CDC partnered with a private party like American Society
for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), and allowed donors and families to volunteer to
higher tiers of disclosure, then the registry would be more comprehensive and have a
better chance of achieving its policy goals. Partnering with ASRM would allow the
joint-entity to use its power as a professional organization to encourage more disclosure
than HHS is currently allowed to mandate, and would justify the creation of a registry
that collects more information than the HHS can legally require.
Both the CDC and the FDA have a current practice of partnering with private
professional organizations. The CDC already has an extensive partnership with ASRM
and its partner organization, the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART)
under the FCSRCA, where it allows clinics to report their data to SART directly. As
for the FDA, it already has a practice of encouraging individuals to participate in
pregnancy registries run by private parties by linking to them on the FDA website. Thus,
establishing the donor gamete registry as a joint project between the FDA, the CDC, and
ASRM would allow the entities to pool their authority to create the most comprehensive
registry by encouraging participants to volunteer more information than the government
is currently allowed to collect.
D. HIPAA Implications of a National Donor Gamete Registry
One of the biggest challenges to creating a successful donor gamete registry is ensuring
the privacy of the participants. The donor gamete registry would contain protected
health information because donors would be tracked across clinics through a social
security number, insurance number, or some other individual identifiable information.
As a result, the registry and its owner would be subject to the Privacy and Security
Rules.186 Donors, as well as children linked to donors, would have to authorize the
release of their data for research purposes.187 The donor gamete registry could follow
the NIH’s model in DS-Connect, where NIH stores all the data, but only releases de186
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identified data to approved researchers.188 This “sponsor review model” would, on the
one hand, prevent inappropriate uses of sensitive information, but could also raise public
distrust because then the registry would be owned by the government and the ASRM,
not by the donors and children.189
The relatively small donor gamete community heightens existing concerns with privacy
breaches.190 Furthermore, even de-identifying this data does not necessarily mean that
people’s protected health information will be secure. Professor Barbara Evans, in her
discussion of the Sentinel Initiative, recommends “segregating key functions that use
identifiable health information as inputs, and sharply restricting the number of [entities]
handling patients’ sensitive health data” to prevent harmful disclosure.191 These
recommendations would apply to a gamete donor registry as well.

VII. C
 ONCLUSION: HHS IS TRENDING TOWARD A DONOR
GAMETE REGISTRY
Despite the very real privacy concerns that a donor gamete registry raises, it is undeniable
that HHS has experience partnering with non-governmental entities to facilitate public
access to data from post-market clinical trials and patient and product registries. The
increasing post-market surveillance suggests that not only does the public support this
trend, but also that the health and technology sectors have the necessary expertise to
create secure systems. The rising use of donor gametes to create families, coupled with
the success of the Donor Sibling Registry, suggests that it is an optimal time to create a
national donor gamete registry.

188

See Understanding Your Participation in DS-Connect supra note 127.

189

Mello et al., supra note 110, at 1656.

190

See Swink & Reich, supra note 17, for an example of how a child tracked down his sperm donor
online even though the donation was supposed to be anonymous.
191

Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model, supra note 137, at 640–41.

Conceiving a National Gamete Donor Registry

55

56

Health Law & Policy Brief • Volume 9, Issue 1 • Spring 2015

